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SUMMARY
A general review of approaches to causality is given from a statistical perspective.
Three broad notions are distinguished. In the ﬁnal part of the paper the challenges of
reaching potentially causal representations are outlined for a study of some German
political and social attitudes.
1 Generalities
There is a long history in the philosophical literature of discussions of causality. It
typically regards a cause as necessary and suﬃcient for an eﬀect: all children of di-
vorced parents have behavioural problems and all children with behavioural problems
have divorced parents. In virtually all sociological contexts, however, the concern is
with multiple causes, even if one is predominant. Thus explicit or implicit statistical
considerations are inescapable.
Even within the statistical view of causality there are a number of diﬀerent formu-
lations. Here we review three. In the ﬁnal section of the paper a speciﬁc illustration is
sketched.
∗Research Report, ZUMA 00-07; as submitted to European Sociological Review
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2 Notions of causality
2.1 Causality as stable association
Suppose that there is clear evidence that two features of the individuals (people, com-
munities, households, ...) under investigation are associated, a possible cause C and a
possible response R. For instance, individuals with high values of C may tend to have
high values of R and vice versa. Thus C and R might be test scores on individuals at
a given age in arithmetic and language or they may be unemployment rate and level
of crime in a community.
What might it mean to conclude that C is a cause of a response R?
2.1.1 Symmetric and directed relations
Association is a symmetric relation between two or possibly more features but causality
is asymmetric. That is, if C is associated with R then R is associated with C, but if
C is a cause of R then R is not a cause of C. Thus, given any two features C and R,
we need to distinguish the possibilities where
1. C and R are to be treated on an equal footing and dealt with symmetrically in
any interpretation
2. one of the variables, say C, is to be regarded as explanatory to the other variable,
R, regarded as a response. Then, if there is a relation, it is regarded asymmetri-
cally.
The distinction here is not about statistical signiﬁcance but rather is concerned
with substantive interpretation.
2.1.2 Graphical representation
A useful graphical representation shows two variables X1 and X2 regarded on an equal
footing, if associated, as connected by an undirected edge, whereas two variables such
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Figure 1:
(a) Undirected edge between two variables X1, X2 on an equal footing
(b) Directed edge between explanatory variable C and response variable R
(c) General dependence of response R on B, C.
(d) Special situation with R ⊥C | B
(e) Special situation with B ⊥C corresponding in particular to randomization of C.
that C is explanatory to R, if connected, are done so by a directed edge. See Figures
1a and 1b.
There are two possible bases for the distinction between explanatory and response
variables and thus for using a directed edge. One is that features referring to an earlier
time-point are explanatory to features referring to a later time-point. Thus aspects
of previous education may be possible explanatory variables for subsequent career
performance. In such situations the relevant time is not the time when the observation
is made but the time to which the features refer, although, of course observations
recorded retrospectively are especially subject to recall biases. The second is a subject-
matter working hypothesis based for example on theory or on empirical data from other
kinds of investigation. Suppose that cross-sectional data are collected on current salary
and on attitudes to various social and political issues. It might then be reasonable to
regard provisionally income as explanatory to attitudes, of course only as part of a
more complex network of relationships.
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In summary, the ﬁrst step towards causality is to require good reasons for regarding
C as explanatory to R as a response and that any notion of causal connection between
C and R is that C is a cause of R not the other way round.
2.1.3 Common explanatory variables
Next consider the possibility of one or more common explanatory variables. For this,
suppose that a background variable B is potentially explanatory to C and hence also
to R. There are a number of possibilities of which the most general is shown in Figure
1c with directed edges from B to C, from C to R and also directly from B to R. On the
other hand, if the relation were that represented schematically in Figure 1d, the only
dependence between C and R is that induced by their both depending on B. Then
C and R are said to be conditionally independent given B, sometimes conveniently
written R ⊥C | B. There is no direct path from C to R that does not pass via B.
Such relations are typically assessed empirically by some form of regression analysis.
In such a situation one would not regard C as a cause of R even though in an analysis
without the background variable B there is a statistical dependence between C and R.
This discussion leads to one deﬁnition used in the literature of C being a cause
of R, namely that there is a dependence between C and R and that the sign of that
dependence is unaltered whatever variables B1, B2, . . . themselves explanatory to C are
considered simultaneously with C as possible sources of dependence. This deﬁnition
has a long history but is best articulated by I. J. Good and P. Suppes. A corresponding
notion for time series is due to N.Wiener and C.W.J. Granger. This deﬁnition underlies
much empirical statistical analysis in so far as it aims towards causal explanation.
The deﬁnition entertains all possible alternative explanatory variables. In any par-
ticular study one can at best check that the measured background variables B do not
account for the dependence between C and R. The possibility that the dependence
could be explained by variables explanatory to C that have not been measured, i.e.
by so-called unobserved confounders, is less likely the larger the apparent eﬀect and
can be discounted only by general plausibility arguments about the ﬁeld in question.
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Sensitivity analysis may be helpful as it involves calculating what the properties of an
unobserved confounder would have to be to explain away the dependence in question.
When the empirical dependence found is very strong it may be possible to argue that it
is implausible that there is an unmeasured variable itself with a strong enough depen-
dence to explain away totally the observed eﬀect. For further details see Rosenbaum
(1995).
2.1.4 Role of randomization
Although physical randomization by the investigator is rarely possible in sociological
investigations, it is conceptually important to consider brieﬂy its consequences for in-
terpretation. Then in the scheme sketched in Figure 1e there can be no edge between
the B’s and C since such dependence would be contrary to randomization, i.e. to each
individual under study being equally likely to receive each treatment possibility. In
this situation an apparent dependence between C and R cannot be explained by a
background variable as in Figure 1d. It is in this sense that causality can be inferred
from randomized experiments and not from observational studies as sometimes stated,
especially in the statistical literature. While, other things being equal, randomized
experiments are greatly to be preferred to observational studies, diﬃculties of inter-
pretation, sometimes serious, remain. The most important are possible interactive
eﬀects, especially with unobserved explanatory variables, and unanticipated future in-
terventions in the system under study that remain unnoticed when the ﬁnal response
is recorded.
2.1.5 Intermediate variables
In the above discussion the variables B have been supposed explanatory to C and hence
to R. For judging a possible causal eﬀect of C it would be wrong to consider in the
same way variables intermediate between C and R, i.e. variables I that are responses
to C and explanatory to R. Although they are valuable in clarifying the nature of any
indirect path between C and R, the use of I as an explanatory variable in a regression
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Figure 2:
(a) Intermediate variable I accounting for overall eﬀect of C after ignoring I; R ⊥C | I.
(b) Correlated variables C, C∗ on an equal footing and both explanatory to R
analysis of R on C would not be enough in assessing whether such a path exists. If R
is independent of C given an intermediate variable I, but dependent on I, then C may
still have caused I and I may be a cause of R.
For instance suppose that C represents an aspect of primary school education and I
some feature of secondary education, which in turn aﬀects some aspect of employment;
see Figure 2a. Does the aspect of primary education cause a change in R? If R is
conditionally independent of C given I it would be reasonable to say that primary
education does cause a change in R and that this change appears to be explained via
what happens in secondary education.
2.1.6 Explanatory variables on an equal footing
An even more delicate situation arises with variables C∗ on an equal footing with the
variable C whose causal status is under consideration; see Figure 2b.
If the role of C is essentially the same whether or not C∗ is conditioned, i.e. whether
or not C∗ is included in the regression equation, there is no problem at least at a
qualitative level. On the other hand it is relatively common to ﬁnd clear dependence
on (C, C∗) as a pair but that either variable on its own is suﬃcient to explain the
dependence. There are then broadly three routes to interpretation:
1. to regard (C, C∗) collectively as the possibly causal variables
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2. to present at least two possibilities for interpretation, one based on C and one
on C∗
3. to obtain further information clarifying the relation between C and C∗, estab-
lishing for instance that C∗ is explanatory to C and that the appropriate inter-
pretation is to ﬁx C∗ when analysing variations of R.
For example, suppose that C and C∗ are respectively measures of educational per-
formance in arithmetic and language of a child both measured at the same age and
that the response is some adult feature. Then the third possibility is inapplicable; the
ﬁrst possibility is to regard the variables as a two-dimensional measure of educational
performance and to abandon, at least temporarily, any notion of separating the role of
arithmetic and language. In the second route we would recognize two alternative simple
explanations consistent with the data, one based on arithmetic and one on language.
This is typically studied via the careful examination of empirical regression equations,
for example for binary R via logistic regression.
2.2 Causality as the eﬀect of intervention
2.2.1 Counterfactuals
The concept of causality discussed above is important and is connected with the ap-
proach adopted in many empirical statistical studies. It does, however, not directly
capture a stronger interpretation of the word causal. This is connected with the idea of
hypothetical intervention or modiﬁcation. Suppose for simplicity of exposition that C
takes just two possible forms, to be called presence and absence. Thus presence might
be the implementation of some programme of intervention, absence a suitable control
state. For monotone relations one may say that presence of C causes an increase in the
response R if an individual with C present tends to have a higher R than that same
individual would have had if C had been absent, other things being equal.
Slightly more explicitly let B denote all variables possibly explanatory to C and
suppose that there are no variables C∗ to be considered on an equal footing to C.
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Consider for each individual two possible values of R, Rpres and Rabs, that would arise
as C takes on its two possible values present and absent and B is ﬁxed. Then presence
of C causes, say, an increase in R if Rpres is in some sense systematically greater than
Rabs. The notion of other things being equal is captured by holding B ﬁxed.
This notion is in part a translation of J.Neyman’s and R.A.Fisher’s work on design of
experiments into a more general setting, including an observational one. It is conneced
with work of H.A.Simon and has been systematically studied and very fruitfully applied
by D.B.Rubin.
For a given individual only one of Rpres and Rabs can be observed, corresponding to
the value of C actually holding for that individual. The other value of R is a so-called
counterfactual whose introduction is, however, useful to capture the notion hinted at
above of a deeper meaning of causality.
2.2.2 Formalizing diﬀerences in counterfactuals
The simplest and least demanding relation between the two values of R is that over some
population of individuals under study the average of Rpres exceeds that of Rabs. This is
a notion of an average eﬀect and is testable empirically in favourable circumstances. A
much stronger requirement is that the required inequality holds for every individual in
the population of concern. Stronger still is the requirement that the diﬀerence between
the two values of R is the same for all individuals, i.e. that for all individuals
Rpres −Rabs = ∆.
This is called in the language of the theory of the design of experiments the assumption
of unit-treatment additivity.
Now these last two assumptions are clearly not directly testable and can be objected
to on that account. The assumptions are indirectly testable, to a limited extent at least.
If the individuals are divided into groups, for example on the basis of one or more of
the background variables B, the assumptions imply for each individual observed that
the diﬀerence between the two levels of R has the same sign in the ﬁrst case and the
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second case. However, overlooking that a possibly causal variable C has a very diﬀerent
eﬀect on diﬀerent individuals can have severe consequences.
2.2.3 Intrinsic variables or attributes
There is an important restriction implicit in this discussion. It has to be meaningful in
the context in question to suppose that a potential cause C for an individual might have
been diﬀerent from how it in fact is. This is relevant only to variables that appear solely
as explanatory variables. For example they may be variables measured at base-line,
i.e. at entry into a study. Purely explanatory variables can be divided into intrinsic
variables or attributes, sometimes also called structural variables, which essentially are
deﬁning characteristics of the individual, and potential explanatory variables which
might play the role of C in the present discussion. Intrinsic variables should not be
regarded as potentially causal in the present sense. For example the gender of an
individual is in most contexts an intrinsic characteristic. The question what would R
have been for this woman had she been a man other things being held ﬁxed is in many,
although not quite all, contexts meaningless.
2.2.4 Variables to be held ﬁxed
Finally, care is essential in deﬁning what is to be held ﬁxed under hypothetical changes
of C. In terms of statistical analysis this is the issue of what other variables should
be included as explanatory variables in the regression equation for R in addition to C
itself. Certainly responses I to C are not ﬁxed. Variables, B, explanatory to C are
held ﬁxed. There is an essential ambiguity for variables C∗ on an equal footing with C.
To distinguish changing C to a given level with certain other features held ﬁxed from
the probabilistic notion of conditioning Pearl (1995) has introduced the terminology of
setting C to its required level; see also Pearl (2000) and Lauritzen (2000) for further
discussion.
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2.3 Causality as explanation of a process
There is a third notion of causality that is in some ways more in line with normal
scientiﬁc usage. In this context causality implies that there is some understanding,
albeit provisional, of the process that leads from C to R. This understanding typically
comes from theory, or often from knowledge at a hierarchical level lower than the data
under immediate analysis. Sometimes, it may be possible to represent such a process
by a graph without directed cycles and to visualize the causal eﬀect by the tracing of
paths from C to R via variables I intermediate between C and R. Thus the eﬀect of
interventions at a community level might be related to ideas of individual psychology.
This last notion of causality as concerned with generating processes is to be con-
trasted with the second view of causality as concerned with the eﬀects of intervention
and with the ﬁrst view of causality as stable statistical dependence. These views are
complementary not conﬂicting. Goldthorpe (1998) has argued for this third view of
causality as the appropriate one for sociology with explanation via Rational Choice
Theory as an important route for interpretation.
To be satisfactory there needs to be evidence, typically arising from studies of
diﬀerent kinds, that such generating processes are not merely hypothesized. Causality
is not to be established by merely calling a statistical model causal.
Explanations of phenomena in terms of underlying processes are inevitably pro-
visional. Nevertheless they are the cornerstone of the Natural Sciences. We suggest
that statistical analysis should aim towards establishing processes that are potentially
causal.
3 Special issues
3.1 Interaction involving a potentially causal variable
We now turn to the issue of interactions with a potentially causal variable. The graph-
ical representations used above to show the structure of various kinds of dependency
and independency holding between a set of variables have the limitation, in the form
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used here, that they do not represent interaction, in particular that an eﬀect of C may
be systematically diﬀerent for diﬀerent groups of individuals. For example if B is an
intrinsic feature such as gender, we consider whether the eﬀect of C is diﬀerent for men
and for women. In particular, if the eﬀects of C are in opposite directions for diﬀerent
levels of B we say there is a qualitative interaction, a possibility of special importance
for interpretation.
Note especially that even when C represents a randomized treatment which is
automatically decoupled from preceding possibly unobserved variables B the possibility
of serious interactions with B cannot in general be ignored.
Viewed slightly diﬀerently, absence of interaction is important not only in simpli-
fying interpretation but also in enhancing generalizability and speciﬁcity. That is, an
eﬀect that has been shown to have no serious interaction with a range of potential
variables is more likely to be reproduced in some new situation and more likely to have
a stable subject-matter interpretation.
3.2 Unwanted unobserved intermediate variable
Consider further the role of variables I referring to time points after the implementation
of C. A subject-matter distinction can be drawn between on the one hand intermediate
variables that are responses to C and that are explanatory to R and are part of some
natural process and on the other hand interventions into the system that may depend
on C and which may be explanatory to R but which in some sense are unwanted or
inappropriate for interpretation. Thus in studying the eﬀect of modiﬁcations in inner
city housing policies on satisfaction it may be necessary to take account of interventions
other than those which are the immediate object of study. Another example is in
evaluations of study programs whenever students in only one of the programs receive
unplanned intensive encouragement during the evaluation period.
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3.3 Aggregation
So far little has been said about the choice of observational units for study. At a
fundamental research level it may be wise to choose individuals showing the eﬀects of
interest in their simplest and most striking form. More generally, however, the choice
has to be considered at two levels. There is the level at which ultimate interpretation
and action is required and the level at which careful observation of largely decoupled
individuals is available. For example a criminologist comparing diﬀerent sentencing
or policing policies is interested in individual oﬀenders but may be able to observe
only diﬀerent communities or policing areas. A nutritional epidemiologist comparing
diﬀerent diets is interested in individual people but may have to rely, in part at least,
on consumption and mortality data from whole countries. The assumption that a
dependence established on an aggregate scale, for example at a country level, has a
similar interpretation at a small-scale level, for example for individual persons, involves
the assumption that there are no confounders B at a person level that would account
for the apparent dependency. This will typically be very hard or even impossible to
check at all carefully from country level data.
4 Bradford Hill’s conditions
The above discussion implicitly emphasizes that, while causal understanding is the aim
of perhaps nearly all research work, a cautious approach is essential, especially but not
only in observational studies. The most widely quoted conditions tending to make a
causal interpretation more likely are those of Hill (1965) put forward in connection with
the interpretation of epidemiological studies. Hill emphasized their tentative character.
For a critical discussion of these conditions, see Rothman and Greenland (1998).
Because they are usually mentioned in an epidemiological context we reproduce them
in outline in a slightly revised version (Cox and Wermuth, 1996, section 8.7).
According to these conditions a dependency is more likely to be causal
• if an a priori subject-matter explanation of it is available
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• if a convincing subject-matter explanation is found retrospectively although such
is typically less convincing than an a priori explanation
• if the eﬀect is a large one, it then being less likely that there is an alternative
explanation via an unmeasured confounder
• if the dependency has a natural monotonic relation with levels of the explanatory
variable in question
• if the eﬀect is found repeatedly in independent studies especially if these are of
somewhat diﬀerent form
• if there is no major interaction with intrinsic features
• if the dependence is the consequence of a massive intervention in the system.
The bacteriologist Koch gave conditions for inferring causality when the potential
cause can be applied, withdrawn and reapplied in a relatively controlled way and the
pattern of response observed. Similar ideas were used in psychology following early
experiments by Pavlow with conditioning stimuli and the extinction of responses after
withdrawing the stimulus.
5 A sociological case study
Causal formulations are common in social science contexts whenever empirical research
is planned to study explanations for the development of opinions, attitudes and judge-
ments or behaviour. In these cases those statistical models and analyses are especially
helpful which permit to include prior expectations on a developmental process since
they provide interpretations that are compatible with causal explanations.
We give an example of deriving a graphical Markov model that concerns the de-
velopment of attitudes towards interventions by the state. In the case of increasing
unemployment should the state intervene? For the general well-being of the society
should the state provide for a social net?
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Data are from the German General Social Surveys (Central Archive for Empirical
Social Research, 1985; 1992). They are cross-sectional surveys which started in 1980
and are typically carried out every second year. A special additional survey was done
in 1991 in both East and West Germany. Since questions on attitudes towards state
interventions and on their possible determinants were asked only in 1991 and in 1984,
i.e. before uniﬁcation, only West Germans are included in the analyses. And, since we
study risk of exclusion from work-force as one of the possible determinants the data
are restricted to individuals who are between 18 and 65 years old.
Figure 3 shows a ﬁrst ordering of the variables with four boxes indicating four
possible stages of development, ranging from given background or context variables
on the far right to the response variable of primary interest on the far left: attitude
towards state interventions, Y , a sum score formed from two questions with high values
denoting agreement with interventions. Relations among context variables are known
from many studies, they are taken to be ﬁxed in the present analysis, i.e. they are not
analysed here, they are conditioned on. Two context variables are taken as quantitative
measurements: age, W , and education of parents, V , (0=none , 1=one, or 2=both have
at least 12 years of formal schooling); the three other context variables are binary: own
education, B, (1=at least 12 years of formal schooling), marital status, C (1=married),
and gender, D, (1=female), all taken to have values zero and one.
Risk of exclusion from the work-force, A, (1=yes) is a rough indicator constructed
from information available in the data on unemployment, on the qualiﬁcation to study
at a university and on completed vocational training. It is listed alone in one of the
middle boxes, indicating that it is an intermediate variable, regarded both as a possible
response to each of the context variables (to its right) and as a possible explanatory
variable for the remaining variables (to its left). Two attitudes are expected to be of
a more stable kind: judgement of own social position, X1, (1=lower class to 5= upper
class) and judgement on which factors are important for getting ahead in society, X2.
There are three sepecial aspects of the latter: chance, X21, others, X22, (whealthy fam-
ily, general connections (in 1991), protection (in 1984), political connections, money,
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Figure 3: A ﬁrst ordering of the variables of possible determinants of attitudes towards
interventions by the state
opportunism) or oneself, X23, (own education, hard work, initiative, intelligence). For
each of these measurements a high value indicates strong agreement that the aspect is
important.
Since we do not consider any two of the four judgements to relate like response and
explanatory variable they are treated as being on equal footing, i.e. they are listed in
the same box, so that some joint response model will be used for their analysis. Jointly
they are intermediate variables, i.e. possibly explanatory for the attitude towards state
interventions and possible responses to the risk and the context variables.
The ordering of the boxes provides a plan for the type of analyses to be carried
out: for instance a linear regression for the attitudes towards state intervention on
all other variables, a logistic regression for the risk on all the context variables and a
multivariate regression for the joint responses given the risk and the context variables.
For the purpose of checking for independences we replace the multivariate regression
of the X-variables by univariate analyses for each response taken in turn with all (or
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a subset of) the variables to the right as explanatory variables.
Standard checks for nonlinear relations and interactions did not reveal very strong
eﬀects of either type. Univariate distributions for the raw data and for reduced sets
of data with complete observations on all 11 variables (693 cases in 1991 and 1727
cases in 1984) appeared essentially unchanged. The main changes from 1984 to 1991
in univariate distributions are an increase in the percentage of persons with at least 12
years of formal schooling, from 21% to 27%, and a decrease in percentage of persons
at risk of exclusion from the work-force, from 25% to 20%.
Figure 4: A chain graph developed as a result of analyses
Figure 4 summarizes the analyses done separately for the two years by showing
an arrow for each variable which turned out to be an important explanatory factor in
either year. For instance the contributions of each variable with a missing arrow to
the response of primary interest would have been very minor, i.e. corresponding to a
t-value smaller in absulute value than 1.5 if included next as an explanatory variable
into the regresssion. A dashed-line indicates that a substantial correlation among two
joint responses remained after accounting for all eﬀects of variables being important for
either one. None of the considered context variables were explanatory for the getting-
ahead scales. This can be interpreted positively as the lack of item and scale bias.
By using known relations among the context variables in addition to the regression
results, parts of which are shown in Tables 1 to 3, one of the pathways of development
in Figure 4 (Y, X1, A, B, V ) can be interpreted as follows: With parents having less
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formal education it is more likely that the own formal education is shorter. The less
formal education one has the higher is the risk of exclusion from the work-force. High
risk for exclusion from the work-force makes it more likely that the own social position
is judged to be low. Persons who judge their own social position to be low tend to
agree strongly with the type of state interventions considered here. Additional factors
for predicting high agreement with state interventions are the beliefs that chance or
others determine what is important to get ahead in society.
Tables 1-3: Regression coeﬃcients of important variable either 1984 or 1991
Table 1: for response Y , attitude towards state interventions
Explanatory variable 1984 1991
X1, social position -0.35 -0.46
X2, getting ahead
X21, chance 0.11 0.15
X22, others 0.07 0.04
constant 5.99 6.35
Table 2: for response X1, judgement of own social position
Explanatory variable 1984 1991
A, risk for low social position -0.17 -0.18
B, own education 0.39 0.40
C, married 0.04 0.15
V , education of parents 0.22 0.17
constant 2.68 2.67
Table 3: for response A, risk for exclusion from work-force
Explanatory variable 1984 1991
B, own education -1.16 -0.97
C, married -0.31 -0.73
D, gender 0.74 0.23
constant -1.11 -0.86
Probably the most remarkable ﬁnding of this study is the strong agreeement in
qualitative conclusions in the years 1984 and 1991. The regression coeﬃcients shown
for directly important factors determining attitude towards state interventions (in Table
1) are essentially identical. For the judgement of the own social position (in Table 2)
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the general level and the eﬀects of the predictors risk for exclusion from work-force
and own education are unchanged over the years, while the importance of parents’
education has decreased and the eﬀect of marital status is strong only in 1991. Though
the overall risk of exclusion from work-force has decreased in Germany from 1984 to
1991 the direction of dependencies has remained unchanged for own education, marital
status and gender. The risk is higher for less formal schooling, for females, and for the
unmarried. Only the relative importance of gender has diminished, the one of marital
status has increased over the years. Thus, the type of dependencies are replicated
except when political changes can explain changes in dependencies.
The interpretation in terms of tracing paths is close to the original suggestions of
Sewell Wright for path analyses in linear systems. Graphical Markov models are one
extension of path analysis in which responses, intermediate and explanatory variables
may be quantitative or categorical variables and in which joint instead of only single
responses may be modelled. Linear structural equation models are a diﬀerent extension
of path analysis. The main diﬀerences to a chain graph model such as the one of Figure
4 are twofold. It is the way in which categorical response variables are modelled and it
is the interpretation of parameters. In chain graphs every edge in the graph, missing
or present, can be interpreted as a particular conditional relationsship, the vanishing
of an edge means a conditional independence statement, whereas the interpretation of
parameters in a linear structural equation model may have to be derived from scratch
if it does not coincide with a chain graph model.
In summary the analysis sketched here aims to ﬁnd pathways of dependence from
the baseline variables through the intermediate variables to the ﬁnal response variable.
While, of course, conclusions from a single observational study are inevitable provi-
sional, the approach brings us a step closer to the notions of causality discussed in
the ﬁrst part of the paper. The analysis gives more insight than, for example only
direct regression analysis of the ﬁnal response on all available potentially explanatory
variables.
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6 Some references on causality
The extensive and growing literature on statistical aspects of causality is best ap-
proached via the discussion paper of Holland (1986); see also Cox and Wermuth (1996,
Section 8.7). For general issues about observational studies, see Cochran (1965) and
Rosenbaum (1995). For a philosophical perspective, see Simon (1972) and Cartwright
(1989). For an interventionist view, see Rubin (1974) and for a more formal approach
still from a social science viewpoint Sobel (1995). For a systematic account based on
directed acyclic graphs, see Pearl (1995, 2000) and for the general connections with
graph theory Lauritzen (2000). For an approach based on a complete speciﬁcation of
all independencies between a set of variables followed by a computer-generated listing
of all directed acyclic graphs consistent with those independencies, see Spirtes et al.
(1993). The use of counterfactuals is criticized by Dawid (2000). Be aware that many
rather diﬀerent interpretations of causality are involved in these discussions.
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